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BOOK REVIEWS
EDWARD H. WARREN, Margin Customers, The Plimpton Press,
Norwood, Massachusetts, (1941) pp. i-xi, 1-464, $4.00.
Professor Warren of the Harvard Law School takes up the
question of what is the fundamental relation between a margin
customer and a stock broker in the event a stock broker re-pledges
the security deposited with him. In other words, may there be a
conversion of the pledgor margin customer's interest? If the stock
broker makes way with the security of the margin customer, what
is the nature of the pledgor's claim? Is the claim in rem or ex
contractu?
The author takes the position that Judge Cardozo, when on the
New York Court of Appeals, laid the foundation for undermining the
remedy of trover in the famous case of Wood v. Fisk.*
Professor Warren rightfully contends, in the opinion of the
reviewer, that the margin customer should have both remedies of
trover and breach of contract. In a very entertaining manner,
replete with pithy comments and entertaining sarcasm, Professor
Warren traces the early history of the law of pledge, the possible
effects of Judge Cardozo's decision, and states what, in his opinion,
should be the law governing the broken relationship of pledgor and
pledgee. The reason for Warren insisting upon property protection
seemingly lies in the concern for enabling the pledgor to protect
himself against rascals profiting by their rascality and engendering
greater care in important business transactions.
To tie into Judge Cardozo, now deceased, and hold him
responsible idealogically for the modern day consequences of his
decision in 1915 is similar to holding one accountable for past deeds

when new circumstances have arisen. At rock bottom, the issue
between Warren and Cardozo is whether the broken pledgor-pledgee
relationship is one of property or contract. In other words, when is
a relationship so? To the reviewer, anything is so only when it is
actually so and is not so merely because thought so. A matter may be
thought so when it is not so. Otherwise, there would be no reason for
the existence of the thought. The reason for the conception of property conversion is the inadequacy of contractual protection. The
reason for giving contractual protection to a broken property relationship is the absence of any property protection. Why Professor Warren should insist upon an option of remedy and a waiver if election is
made, and at the same time, insist so strongly upon the recognition of
protection of the relation as a property right is not logically clear.
However, a disagreement in opinion between the reviewer and
Professor Warren is not greatly material to the importance of the
work which Professor Warren has done. The cases are exhausted in
* 215 N. Y. 233, 109 N. E. 177 (1915).
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chapter 9 and 10 and if the reviewer had been writing the book, this
case material would have constituted the major portion of the book
for it is clearly the most important.
Professor Warren performs incidental meritorious service in
making it clear, although he is not the first one, that a demand and
refusal are only pertinent when there has been a tortious withholding. Tortious transfers, tortious takings, tortious alterations, and
many other cases of conversion do not require a demand for the
return of the converted property and the refusal thereof.
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